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Summary
The question of how we experience ownership of an entire
body distinct from the external world is a fundamental
problem in psychology and neuroscience [1–6]. Earlier
studies suggest that integration of visual, tactile, and propri-
oceptive information in multisensory areas [7–11] mediates
self-attribution of single limbs. However, it is still unknown
how ownership of individual body parts translates into the
unitary experience of owning a whole body. Here, we used
a ‘‘body-swap’’ illusion [12], in which people experienced
an artificial body to be their own, in combination with func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging to reveal a coupling
between the experience of full-body ownership and neural
responses in bilateral ventral premotor and left intraparietal
cortices, and left putamen. Importantly, activity in the ventral
premotor cortex reflected the construction of ownership of
a whole body from the parts, because it was stronger when
the stimulated body part was attached to a body, was
present irrespective of whether the illusion was triggered
by stimulation of the hand or the abdomen, and displayed
multivoxel patterns carrying information about full-body
ownership. These findings suggest that the unitary experi-
ence of owning an entire body is produced by neuronal pop-
ulations that integrate multisensory information across
body segments.Results and Discussion
When we look down at our body, we immediately experience
that it belongs to us. We experience our body not as a set of
fragmented parts, but rather as a single entity. How does this
perception of owning an entire body arise? At the heart of
this problem lies the necessity of binding together visual,
tactile, and proprioceptive information from multiple body
parts into a unitary multisensory percept of one’s own whole
body. Here, we addressed this question by measuring healthy
participants’ brain activity with functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) as they experienced controlled changes in
ownership of an entire body using the ‘‘body-swap’’ illusion
paradigm [12]. This illusion is elicited when a participant
observes tactile stimulation on the body of a mannequin
from the point of view of the mannequin’s head while feeling3These authors contributed equally to this work
*Correspondence: valeria.petkova@ki.seidentical synchronous touches on his or her own body, which
is out of sight.
We hypothesized that two basic processes would mediate
ownership of an entire body. First, the self-attribution of indi-
vidual body parts was expected to be mediated through inte-
gration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information in
body-part-centered coordinates by neuronal populations in
the ventral premotor and intraparietal cortices [3]. This predic-
tion was based on neuroimaging studies investigating feelings
of limb ownership [8, 9] and on neurophysiological studies in
nonhuman primates revealing that these areas contain
neurons that integrate visual, tactile, and proprioceptive infor-
mation in reference frames centered on different parts of the
body (e.g., the hand, arm, and head) [13–17].
Second, we hypothesized that the perceptual binding of
owned body parts into a unified whole is supported by multi-
sensory integration across body segments. This hypothesis
was based on the observation that, during full-body illusion,
the feeling of ownership spreads out from the stimulated
body part to the rest of the (unstimulated) body [12]. We pre-
dicted that the underlying neural mechanism would be the
visuosomatic integration across body segments, performed
by special groups of multisensory neurons located in the pre-
motor and intraparietal areas that have visuosomatic receptive
fields extending across several body segments [14, 15, 18, 19],
sometimes even encompassing the entire body [20].
To test the first hypothesis (above), we developed an fMRI-
compatible setup to induce the body-swap illusion (see
Supplemental Results and Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures available online) and performed two separate fMRI
experiments. In the first experiment, involving 26 naive partic-
ipants, we investigated the specific hypothesis that full-body
ownership is associated with visuotactile integration in key
multisensory regions, but only in the context of seeing
a humanoid body [12]. To this end, we employed a two-by-
two factorial design in which we systematically varied the
type of object observed (humanoid body versus wooden
object) and the timing of the visual and tactile stimuli (synchro-
nous versus asynchronous) and computed the interaction
term, which identified areas showing a greater effect of visuo-
tactile synchrony in the context of seeing the humanoid body
[8, 9, 12] (see Figure S1). In support of our hypothesis, we
found significant activation in the right ventral premotor cortex
(PMv) (54, 4, 34; t = 3.41; p = 0.031) (all coordinates reported are
inMNI space), the left PMv (260, 12, 28; t = 3.76; p = 0.012), and
the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) (238, 248, 54; t = 3.72;
p = 0.014) (Figure 1; Table S1). We also observed activation
in the left putamen that did not reach significance after correc-
tion for multiple comparisons (222, 28, 8; t = 3.18; p < 0.001,
uncorrected). However, because this multisensory structure
[21] was significantly activated in subsequent experiments, it
is noteworthy to report here (Figure S2).
In the second fMRI experiment, we tested the hypothesis
that the multisensory processes giving rise to the full-body
illusion operate in body-centered reference frames [22, 23].
We compared conditions where the artificial body was pre-
sented in a similar location and orientation as the participant’s
real body (i.e., viewed from the first-person visual perspective
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Figure 1. Activation during the Full-Body Illusion in Experiment 1: Stronger Effect of Visuotactile Synchrony When Observing the Mannequin
Activation maps corresponding to the interaction term in the factorial design (synchrony3 human body), superimposed on a mean anatomical image for all
26 participants (threshold at p < 0.001, uncorrected for display purposes). The plots represent the contrast estimates (beta parameters of the general linear
model) for the significant peaks (p < 0.05 after small volume correction) for the left and right ventral premotor area (A and B) and the left intraparietal sulcus
(C). B and W stand for body and wood, respectively; S and A stand for synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, respectively. Error bars
represent the standard error. For further details, see Figure S1 and Table S1.
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1119in near-personal space) or when the body was lying directly
opposite the participant (i.e., viewed from the third-person
visual perspective in far extrapersonal space) (Figure S1).
Accordingly, in a new group of 20 naive participants, we
manipulated the visual perspective (first-person versus third-
person) and the timing of touches (synchronous versus asyn-
chronous) in a two-by-two factorial design. We examined the
interaction term, which in this analysis identifies enhanced
responses to visuotactile synchronicity when the body is
seen from the first-person perspective in near-personal space.
In agreement with our hypothesis, we observed significant
interaction in the right PMv (62, 2, 26; t = 3.61; p = 0.032) and
the left IPS (246, 248, 58; t = 3.33, p = 0.041) and a statistical
trend in the left PMv (254, 20, 34; t = 3.07; p = 0.001, uncor-
rected) (Figure 2; Table S1). In addition, we found significant
activity in the left putamen matching that observed in the first
experiment (226, 28, 6; t = 3.60; p = 0.021) (Figure S2).
Importantly, in both experiments, the levels of activity in key
multisensory areas associated with body-centered visuoso-
matic integration correlated with the degree of subjectively
experienced full-body ownership. In the first experiment, the
blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response in the left
PMv was significantly related to the strength of the illusion
as rated by the participants directly after the scans (regression
analysis; see Supplemental Experimental Procedures) (260,
16, 16; t = 3.70; p = 0.05) (Figure 3A). In the second experiment,Co
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Figure 2. Activation during the Full-Body Illusion in Experiment 2: Stronger Eff
Perspective
Activation maps corresponding to the interaction term in the factorial design (s
image for all 20 participants (p < 0.001, uncorrected for display purposes). The
model) for the significant peaks of activation in the right PMv (A) and left IPS (C
0.001, uncorrected), which did not reach significance after correction formultipl
tively; S and A stand for synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile stimulatio
putamen, see Figure S2.we found such significant relationships in the right PMv (44, 18,
34; t = 4.09; p = 0.036) and the left dorsal premotor cortex
(PMd) (242, 6, 48; t = 3.98; p = 0.042) (Figures 3B and 3C). In
summary, the results from the two first experiments provide
compelling evidence that the illusion of owning an entire
body relies on body-part-centered integration of visual and
somatic signals in multisensory areas.
Next, we focused on the central issue of how the feeling of
ownership spreads from the site of stimulation to encompass
the whole body, as is known to occur during the body-swap
illusion [12]. In a third fMRI experiment, with a new group of
20 naive participants, we employed two complementary
experimental designs to directly test the hypothesis that multi-
sensory integration across body segments mediates the
perceptual binding of owned body parts.
In the first design, we stimulated the right hand either when it
was visually perceived as part of the mannequin’s body or
when the same hand was presented in isolation, i.e., as
a detached limb. On the basis of previous work on the
rubber-hand illusion [24–26] and our own pilot experiments,
we hypothesized that strong ownership of a limb would only
be present when the limb was perceived to be part of a body
and that, in this context, the self-attribution of the limb would
spread to the rest of the body. Thus, in a two-by-two factorial
design, we manipulated the integrity of the body and the right
hand (attached versus detached) and the timing of the touchesL. Intraparietal sulcus
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Figure 3. The Strength of the Illusion Is Linearly Related to the Amplitude of the BOLD Signal in the Premotor Cortex in Experiments 1 and 2
Participants who reported stronger self-attribution of the mannequin in the postscan questionnaires also exhibited greater illusion-related BOLD signal
response (interaction term in the factorial designs) in the premotor cortex in study 1 (A) and study 2 (B and C) (p < 0.05 after small volume correction; acti-
vation maps have a threshold of p < 0.001, uncorrected for display purposes).
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1120(synchronous versus asynchronous). Critically, we observed
significant activations in the left PMv (248, 6, 32; t = 3.60;
p = 0.020) and the left IPS (242, 238, 46; t = 4.00; p = 0.006)
that reflected a greater effect of visuotactile synchrony when
the arm was attached to the body (interaction term in the
factorial design) (Figure 4A; Table S1). Again, weaker
responses were noted in the left putamen (226, 4, 28;
t = 3.97; p = 0.001, uncorrected) (Figure S2). These results
show that the perceived limb-body integrity augments the pre-
motor-intraparietal activation, supporting our hypothesis that
neural computations in these areas reflect the spread of
ownership across connected body parts (see above).
In the second design, we compared conditions in which we
elicited the illusion by stimulating either the hand or the
abdomen (compared against the corresponding asynchro-
nous controls). We hypothesized that the neuronal popula-
tions that mediate full-body ownership by integrating multi-
sensory information across body parts should be active
irrespective of the body part stimulated (i.e., body part inde-
pendent). Consistent with this hypothesis, we found a signifi-
cant cluster of voxels in the left PMv that was active when
the body-swap illusion was triggered by stimulation in both
the abdomen and the hand (250, 0, 30; t = 3.39; p = 0.030;
conjunction analysis; Figure 4B).
This premotor activation could, however, reflect either
a genuine full-body ownership representation (i.e., one that
could be implemented by multisensory neurons with receptive
fields extending to multiple body segments) or activation of
distinct groups of neurons with receptive fields restricted to
individual body segments intermingledwithin the same voxels.
To examine this effect, we applied multivoxel pattern analysis,
a technique sensitive to fine-grained spatial patterns and sub-
voxel information [27, 28]. We used local multivariate brain
mapping [29] to search formultivoxel patterns in the left ventral
premotor cortex where classifiers trained to decode the illu-
sion induced by stimulating the abdomen (i.e., distinguish
synchronous from asynchronous visuotactile stimulation of
the abdomen) could successfully generalize to decode
patterns of activity reflecting the illusion when the hand was
stimulated (i.e., distinguish synchronous from asynchronous
visuotactile stimulation of the hand). We found such voxels
in all 20 subjects (Figure 4C; p < 0.05, uncorrected, permuta-
tion test with 999 iterations; see Supplemental ExperimentalProcedures for details), and the decoding accuracy at the
group level was significantly above chance, as was the reverse
generalization from hand to abdomen (p < 0.05, permutation
test, 999 iterations; Figure S3). Crucially, these multivoxel
patterns were specific to the full-body illusion, because the
classifiers failed to generalize when the hand was not attached
to the mannequin’s body (Figure 4C). Importantly, no body-
part-specific patterns were identified within this body-part-
independent section of the premotor cortex, because the
classifiers failed to distinguish between synchronous visuo-
tactile stimulation of the hand and abdomen. Taken together,
these results suggest that activity in the left ventral premotor
cortex reflects ownership generalized to the whole body.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the activations related to stimu-
lation of the hand or the abdomen overlapped only partly (Fig-
ure 4B), allowing us to identify sections in the premotor and
intraparietal cortices that selectively responded to visuotactile
stimulation to one body part only (body part specific). This
result suggests the existence of groups of multisensory cells
in the human brain with receptive fields restricted to individual
body parts, in analogy to the brains of nonhuman primates
[13–19, 30, 31]. Given our results, we questioned whether we
could detect ownership-relatedmodulation in the BOLD signal
in these body-part-specific regions, in line with the psycholog-
ical observation that ownership spreads from the stimulated
body part to the rest of the body [12]. Interestingly, we
observed augmentation of the BOLD signal in abdomen-
specific cortical sections of both the ventral premotor and
intraparietal cortices, especially when the stimulation was
applied to the hand attached to the mannequin’s body
(interaction contrast; p < 0.001, uncorrected) (Figure 4D). We
speculate that this effect is a sign of the facilitation of the
integration of visual and proprioceptive information in
abdomen-specific neuronal populations during the full-body
illusion, driven by the integration of visual, tactile, and propri-
oceptive signals from the stimulated hand. Although the
present experiment was not designed to test specific hypoth-
eses about the mechanism producing this modulatory effect,
we speculate that corticocortical connections within the pre-
motor-intraparietal system [30] or horizontal connections
within the ventral premotor cortex may mediate it.
In summary, two major findings have been revealed in the
present study. First, we found activation in the premotor
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Figure 4. Activation Specific to Full-Body Ownership in Experiment 3
(A) The activation in the left ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) related to the full-body illusionwas significantly augmentedwhen
the handwas perceived as part of the body (p < 0.05, corrected). aH and dH indicatewhether the handwas attached or detached, respectively; S and A stand
for synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, respectively. Error bars in (A) and (D) represent the standard error. Activationmaps in (A) and (B)
are at a threshold of p < 0.001, uncorrected for display purposes.
(B) Active voxels in the left PMv and IPS can be classified as body part specific (hand in yellow, abdomen in red) or body part independent (orange, conjunc-
tion of hand and abdomen).
(C) Multivoxel patterns in the left PMv reflect ownership generalized across body parts; classifiers trained to decode the illusion (synchronous versus asyn-
chronous visuotactile stimulation) induced on the abdomen could successfully decode the illusion evoked when touching the hand. This generalization
failed when the hand was perceived as a detached limb, both when the classifiers were trained on the abdomen and on the attached hand. The brain
map shows voxels with a decoding accuracy significantly above chance in one representative subject (p < 0.05, permutation test, 999 iterations, uncor-
rected). The bar charts and error bars represent group average peak decoding accuracies (n = 20) and standard deviations, respectively. *p < 0.05 for group
decoding accuracy, permutation test, 999 iterations. The reversed generalization was also confirmed (Figure S3).
(D) Abdomen-specific sections of the left PMv and IPS display an increase in the BOLD signal when the full-body illusion is driven by visuotactile stimulation
on the hand, but only when it is attached to the mannequin’s body (p < 0.001, uncorrected).
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1121cortex, intraparietal cortex, and putamen that mirrored the
perceptual rules of the full-body ownership illusion [12, 22,
23]. The anatomical locations of these activations were in
regions that are well-known multisensory processing nodes
in the primate brain (see Supplemental Discussion). Consistent
activations across the three experiments were found only in
these multisensory regions, and not in other parts of the brain,
even when we lowered the statistical threshold (p < 0.001,
uncorrected; see Supplemental Discussion). Our results thus
suggest that the integration of visual, tactile, and propriocep-
tive information in body-part-centered reference frames repre-
sents a basic neural mechanism underlying the feeling of
ownership of entire bodies. This finding generalizes existing
models of limb ownership to the case of the entire body
[3, 7, 10, 32]. Second, our results show that, in addition to
body-part-specific multisensory integration, a process exists
that mediates the perceptual binding of the parts into a unified
percept of a whole owned body. Activation in the keymultisen-
sory areas (ventral premotor cortex, intraparietal cortex, and
putamen) increased when the stimulated body part wasattached to a body, as compared to when it was detached,
showing that the context of integrity between body segments
facilitates ownership of these parts. Furthermore, in the left
ventral premotor cortex, we found an active area and multi-
voxel patterns of activity that reflected full-body ownership
irrespectively of which body part was simulated. The latter
two findings can best be explained by a parsimonious model
in which the unitary experience of owning a whole body is
produced by neuronal populations in the ventral premotor
cortex, and possibly in other multisensory areas, that integrate
multisensory information across body parts. This type ofmulti-
sensory integration could be ideally implemented by neurons
with large visual, tactile, and proprioceptive receptive fields
extending over multiple body segments [15, 19, 33, 34].
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes three figures, one table, Supplemental
Results, Supplemental Discussion, and Supplemental Experimental
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